ABSTRACT: Recently, multihop 
INTRODUCTION
Wireless mesh networks (WMNs) have recently concerned rising attention and deployment as a promising low-cost approach to give last-mile high speed Internet access at urban scale [2] , [3] . Typically, a WMN is a multihop layered wireless. The first layer consists of access points, which are high-speed wired Internet way in points. In the second layer, stationary mesh routers form a multihop spine via long-range highspeed wireless methods such as WiMAX [6] . The wireless spine connects to wired access points at some mesh routers through high speed wireless links. The third layer consists of a huge number of mobile network users. These network users access the network either by a direct wireless link or through a chain of other peer users to a nearby mesh router. WMNs correspond to a unique marriage of the ubiquitous coverage of large area cellular networks with the ease and the speed of the local area Wi-Fi networks [4] . The compensation of WMNs also contains low deployment costs, self-configuration and self maintenance, good scalability, high robustness, etc. [2] .Security and privacy issues are of mainly a concern in pushing the success of WMNs for their large deployment and for supporting service-oriented applications. Due to the essentially open and distributed nature of WMNs, it is necessary to enforce network access control to cope with both free riders and spiteful attackers. Dynamic access to WMNs should be subject to successful user authentication based on the correctly pre recognized trust among users and the network operator; otherwise, network access should be forbidden. On the other hand, it is also dangerous to provide good provisioning over user privacy as WMN communications regularly contain a vast amount of sensitive user details. The wireless standard, open network structural design, and be lacking in of physical protection over mesh routers render WMNs extremely vulnerable to different privacy-oriented attacks. These attacks range from passive eavesdropping to active message Phishing, interception, and modification, which could simply lead to the leakage of user information. Obviously, the wide deployment of WMNs can succeed only after users are assured for their capability to manage privacy risks and preserve their desired level of anonymity. Included with sensors and cameras, the WMN may also be used to gather information of interest. Perceptibly, all these communications include different kinds of sensitive user information like individual identities, actions, position information, fiscal information, transaction summaries, social/business connections, and so on. Once disclosed to the attackers, this information could negotiation any user's privacy, and when further associated together, can cause even more overwhelming consequences. Hence, securing user privacy is of paramount practical importance in WMNs. Moreover, for both billing purpose and avoiding the neglect of network resources, it is also necessary to exclude free riders and let only legitimate residents access WMNs.
Despite the need and significance, limited research has been conducted to address security mechanisms for anonymous and accountable communication in WMNs. This encourages us to propose AACT, a novel Anonymous, Accountable communication topology for WMNs. Our assistance is fourfold as follows:
II. CRYPTOGRAPHY SPECIFICS 2.1 Onion ring strategy [31]
The Onion routing [31] achieves communication privacy by making communication ends as unable to link. An Onion routing network consists of a number of interconnected Onion routers (ORs); each OR has a pair of public/private keys. Each OR knows the topology of the Onion network as well as the public keys of other ORs. An end user that requires an anonymous communication will send a request to an OR that it trusts; this OR is known as the Onion Proxy (OP) for the user. The communication between an end user and its OP is protected from the adversaries. The OP determines a route that consists of a series of ORs and constructs an "Onion" using the public keys of the routers en route. The "Onion" is constructed in a way such that the most inner part is the message to the intended destination. The message is wrapped, i.e., encrypted using the public keys of the ORs in the route, in the same order as the ORs appears in the route. Once an OR receives the Onioned message, it uses its private key to peel, i.e., decrypt, the "Onion", to obtain the information such as the next hop and the session key. It then forwards the rest of the "Onion" to the next hop. This process is repeated until the "Onion" reaches the last OR, which peels the last layer of the "Onion" and obtain the exit information, i.e., the destination. For example, if the private route is 12 .... n R R R  , where i R is the th i OR , and the last router n R will connect to the exit funnel of the' ORs ', which will further communicate with the address requested by the session initiator; the message flow and the "Onion"(s) received at each router in the route are as follows:
pi ' and ' i k ' are the public key and assigned session key for the th i router. After the route is built up, session keys are used for constructing "Onion"s, and anonymous circuit ID (ACI) is used for routing. For the reverse path, data packet was encrypted with the session keys. The OP receives the "Onion" in the reverse path and peels it using the session keys it assigned to the ORs, and sends the raw data to the end user. For an Onion route, only the proxy knows the ¯rst and the last router. Any OR in the route only knows its previous hop and next hop. For both outside attackers and inside attackers (i.e., compromised ORs), as encryption or decryption is processed at every OR, it is difficult to link any two links (a link is a connection between two Onion routers) to the same route. Therefore, for a communication going through the Onion routers, the entry OR and exit OR are unable to link. When there are a large number of connections, it is difficult to ¯nd out the two communication ends for any connection that applies Onion routing.
To avoid that the change of "Onion" size in the route built-up stage may give adversary hints about routing in-formation, an "Onion" has to be padded when part of its information has been read and removed, so that the length of the "Onion" keeps the same and it is difficult for an inside observer to obtain the routing information. Refer to [10] , if the maximum number of Onion routers in a private route is N, the OP will construct a message of N "Onions" to build an Onion route. When an router receives the "Onion"s, it decrypts OP R R R , the message flow and the messages sent at each router are as follows: 
Group Signature
Group signature schemes are a comparatively recent cryptographic concept introduced by Chaum and van Heyst in 1991 [9] . A group signature scheme is a technique for allowing a member of a group to sign a message on behalf of the group. In contrast to ordinary signatures, it gives anonymity to the signer, i.e., A verifier can only tell that a member of any group signed. However, in outstanding cases, such as a legal argument, any group signature can be "opened" by a designated group manager to make known clearly the identity of the signature's originator. Some group signature schemes support revocation, where group membership can be disabled. One of the most recent group signature schemes is the one proposed by Boneh and Shacham [8] , which has an extremely short signature size that is similar to that of an RSA-1024 signature [10] . This scheme is based on the following two problems that are believed to be hard. Let 12 
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION AND THE SCHEME OVERVIEW 3.1 Network Architecture and System Assumptions
In the three-layer architecture consider a metropolitan-scale WMN under the manage of a network operator (NO). The network operator deploys a number of APs and mesh routers and forms a well-connected WMN that covers the whole area of a city and gives network services to network users, i.e., the citizens. Network users, on the other hand, subscribe to the network operator for the services and use their mobile clients to freely access the network from wherever within the city. The membership of network users may be 1) completed/renewed according to user-operator agreement in an episodic manner or 2) dynamically revoked by NO in case of argument/attack. Similar to [4] , [11] , we assume that the downlink from a mesh router to all users within its reporting is one hop. However, the uplink from a user to a mesh router may be one or several hops. That is, a network user wants to transmit packets in multiple hops to a mesh router beyond his direct transmission range. In this case, network users cooperate with each other on relaying the packets to mesh routers. We further assume that all the network traffic has to go through a mesh router except the communication between two direct neighboring users. We assume so as it is probable that communications to and from a mesh router will constitute the majority of traffic in a WMN [12] . Moreover, this assumption would considerably reduce the routing complexity from the users' point of view as mesh routers will take the responsibility.
We assume that NO can always communicate with mesh routers through pre recognized secure channels, and so are mesh themselves. The WMN is assumed to be deployed with redundancy in mind so that revocation of individual mesh routers will not affect network connection. We assume the survival of an offline trusted third party (TTP), which is trusted for not disclosing the information it stores. TTP is essential only during the system setup. We further assume that there is a secure channel among TTP and each network user.
Threat Model and Security Requirements
Due to the open medium and spatially distributed nature, WMNs are susceptible to both passive and active attacks. The passive attacks include eavesdropping, while active attacks range from message relaying, bogus message injection, Phishing, active imitation to mesh router cooperation. Hence, for a practical threat model, we consider an adversary that is able to eavesdrop all network communications, as well as inject random fake messages. In addition, the adversary can compromise and control a small number of users and mesh routers subject to his option; it may also set up rogue mesh routers to phish user accesses. The purposes of the adversary contain 1) illegal and unaccountable network access, 2) the privacy of genuine network users, and 3) denial-ofservice (DoS) attacks against service accessibility.
In light of the above threat model, the following security requirements are necessary to make sure that a WMN functions correctly and strongly as purposed.
• User-router shared authentication and key agreement: A mesh router and a user should equally authenticate each other to stop both unauthorized network access and Phishing attacks. The user and the mesh router should also set up a shared pairwise symmetric key for session authentication and message encryption.
• User-user mutual authentication and key agreement: Users should also authenticate each other by cooperation in observing to message relaying and routing. Moreover, symmetric keys should be established and efficiently maintained to give session authentication and message encryption over the equivalent traffic.
• Sophisticated user privacy protection: The privacy of users should be well secluded, and we distinguish user privacy against dissimilar entities such as the adversary, NO, and the law authority, as will be complicated in the next section.
• User accountability: In the cases of attacks and argument, the responsible users and/or user groups should be capable to be audited and pinpointed. On the other hand, no innocent users can be framed for disputes/attacks they are not concerned with.
• Membership maintenance: The network should be capable to handle membership dynamics with membership revocation, renewing, and addition.
• DoS resilience: The WMN should maintain service accessibility despite of DoS attacks.
IV. AACT: ANONYMOUS, ACCOUNTABLE COMMUNICATION TOPOLOGY
When designing AACT, we find that none of the obtainable anonymous accountable cryptographic primitives, such as blind signature and group signature schemes, suits our purpose given the security and privacy requirements discussed above. Blind signature and group signature schemes can only give binding anonymously, while AACT demands user accountability, and hence, revocable anonymity. Existing group signature schemes do give revocable secrecy, but cannot support complicated user privacy. This inspiring us to tailor a group signature scheme by combining with onion ring strategy to convene all the necessities. AACT is then built on this onion ring based group signature difference by further integrating it into the authentication and key agreement protocol design.
AACT Key Management
The following setup operations are performed in an offline manner by all the entities in AACT, namely NO, a TTP, mesh routers, network users, and user group managers. AACT works under bilinear groups 12 ( , ) GG with isomorphism and respective generators 1 g and 2 g , as in Section 2.1. AACT also employs hash functions 0
H and H, with respective ranges 2 2 G and p Z . The notation below mainly follows [8] .
NO is responsible for the key generation operation. Specifically, NO proceeds as follows: • TTP has the mapping of , ( 
User-Router Mutual Authentication and Key Agreement
To access the WMN, a network user follows the user-router common authentication and key agreement protocol as particular below, when a mesh router is within his direct communication range. As part of beacon message that is periodically broadcast to declare service existence. Here, CRL and URL denote the mesh router certificate revocation list and the user revocation list, respectively. Specifically, URL contains a set of revocation tokens that corresponds to the revoked group private keys, which is a subset of grt. Both CRL and URL are signed by NO. Upon receipt of (M.1), a network user uidj proceeds as follows: Where E denotes the symmetric encryption of the given message within the brackets using key •. The above protocol allows explicit mutual authentication among a mesh router and a genuine network user; it also enables unilateral anonymous authentication for the network user. Upon successful completion of the protocol, the mesh router and the user also create a shared symmetric key used for the succeeding communication session. And this session is uniquely identified through ( , ) j R r r gg .
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Remarks
Equation (2) 
( , ) ( , ) ( , ) . ( , ) . ( , ) ( ( , ) . ( , ) . ( , ) ).( ( , ) . ( , ) . ( ,
3) holds when there is an element A of URL encoded in 12 ( , ) TT because of the following.
We know that
GG  is an isomorphism such that 
. , , , . User Anonymity against the Adversary, the User Groups, and TTP In AACT, a user only authenticates himself as a genuine service subscriber without disclosing any of his identifying information by make use of the group signature method. Neither the adversary nor the user group managers can tell which meticulous user generates a given signature. The adversary, even by compromising mesh routers and other network users, that is, knowing a number of group private keys in addition to the group public key, still cannot infer any information concerning the meticulous group private key used for signature generation. This is due to the rigidity of the underlying q-SDH problem, where q is a 1,020-bit prime number. Due to the similar reason, neither a user group manager can distinguish whether or not one of his group members has signed a meticulous signature as he has no knowledge of the corresponding , Ax  . Furthermore, each data session in AACT is identified only through pairs of fresh random numbers, which again discloses nothing concerning the user identity information. In addition, AACT needs a network user to refresh session identifiers and the shared symmetric keys for each different session. This further eliminates the ability to link among any two sessions initiated by the same network user. We note that even with the help of compromised mesh routers and other network users, the opponent still cannot judge whether two communication sessions are from the similar user. This is because, basically, none of them can tell whether two signatures are from the same user, given q-SDH problem and decision linear on G problem are hard.
User Privacy against NO and User Accountability:Since NO knows grt, it can always tell which gsk[i, j] produces a given signature. However, NO has no knowledge about to whom gsk[i, j] is assigned as AACT allows a late compulsory among group private keys and network users. Furthermore, it is user group managers' sole responsibility to assign group private keys to every network user without any participation of NO. Therefore, NO could only map gsk[i, j] to the user group i based on i grp . Because no other entities except NO and the key holder himself has the knowledge of the corresponding , ij A , and can therefore, generate the given signature, the key holder must be a member of the user group i. This audit result serves us both necessities. On one hand, the result only discloses partial nonessential attribute information of the user and still protects user privacy to an extent. On the other hand, the result is adequate for user accountability purposes for NO. When NO (on behalf of mesh routers) finds a certain communication session disputable or suspicion, it conducts the following protocol to audit the responsible entity:
1.
Given the link and the session identifier, find the equivalent authentication session message 2 [ , ]
( .2) , , , grp maps to a particular user group i, now a responsible entity has been found from the perspective of NO.
From the user's perspective, only part of his unneeded attribute information is disclosed from the audit. But such unneeded attribute information will not reveal his necessary attribute information. For example, the above audit may find that the dependable user is a member of Company XYZ but cannot reveal any other information about the user. Yet NO still has adequate proof to prove to Company XYZ that one of his members violates certain network access rule so that Company XYZ should take the corresponding responsibility specified in their service contribution agreement.
Revocable User Anonymity against Law Authority: When law authority decides to track the meticulous attacker that is responsible for a certain communication session, the following procedure is taken: NO reports to the law authority ,
i j i
A grp by executing the above protocol against the session in audit. , 
PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS OF AACT 5.1 System Security Analysis
As its basic security functionality, AACT enforces network access control. Hence, we are the majority concerned with the following three different types of attacks, i.e., Bogus data injection attacks, data Phishing attacks, and DoS attacks.
Bogus data injection attacks: In such attacks, the opponent needs to inject bogus data to the WMN aimed at using the network service for free. The sources of the bogus data could be outsiders, revoked users, or revoked mesh routers.
However, such bogus data traffic will be all instantly filtered in AACT. First, with respect to outsiders, they do not know any group private keys. Thus, they cannot produce correct message signatures, when attempting to initialize a communication session with NO and/or other network users. They also cannot bypass the authentication procedure and straightly send out bogus data to others as they do not possess any shared symmetric session keys with them, and thus, cannot produce correct MACs. Then, regarding revoked users, there are two situations: 1) they do not have any group private key at present in use due to group public key update or 2) the corresponding group private keys owned by them are previously revoked and are published in the URL in beacon messages. Obviously, the revoked users cannot increase network access in neither cases. Finally, for revoking mesh routers, they are no longer valid members of the WMN. By checking CRL, no genuine mesh routers will accept/relay data traffic from revoking mesh routers. Also, since the downlink from a mesh router to its service range is only one hop, network users never require to and will not relay data traffic for mesh routers in AACT.
Data phishing attacks: In such attacks, the opponent may set up bogus mesh routers and try to phish user connections to such routers. In this way, the opponent could control network connection and analyze users' data traffic for their benefits. The Phishing mesh routers can be either completely new mesh routers or revoked mesh routers both at the adversary's control. In the former case, the mesh router will not be capable to authenticate itself to the network user. Therefore, no network user will set up any session with such a mesh router. Even if the mesh router could stop the network traffic among a network user and a genuine mesh router, it will not be able to decrypt the message and obtain any useful information. In the latter case, a newly revoked mesh router, however, will possibly be capable to authenticate itself to a network user, if such a user does not possess the most recent version of CRL. The network user may be deceived in this case but only for up to (inverse of the update frequency-(current time-last periodically update time)) time period. This is because the revoked mesh router will not be capable to give a legal CRL update at the next periodical CRL update time point.
DoS attacks: In such attacks, the opponent may flood a huge number of illegal access request messages to mesh routers. The purpose is to exhaust their resources and render them less capable of serving legitimate users. In AACT, for every access request message (M.2), the corresponding mesh router has to confirm a group
